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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE DOG IN THE MANGER1:
THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF WAR ON IOLTA

I. INTRODUCTION
The American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Commission on Interest on
Lawyer’s Trust Accounts (“IOLTA”) hails IOLTA programs2 as “an
innovative funding source” that “supports a cornerstone of democracy” by
“provid[ing] a public benefit without cost to the taxpayer” and “strengthen[ing]
the community by promoting access to justice.”3 Proponents liken IOLTA
programs to the legendary Robin Hood, who insisted: “Rob is a naughty word.
We never rob, we just borrow a bit from those who can afford it.”4
Opponents, however, “decr[y] IOLTA programs as a ‘hidden scheme’
[devised] by ‘left-wing lawyers’ to ‘reach into the pockets of small
businessmen and the middle class to fund their radical agenda.’”5 Clearly, a
canyon of fundamental differences separates IOLTA proponents and
opponents.

1. The assault on IOLTA programs over the past twenty-five years is comparable with the
fabled “dog in the manger”a metaphor in which the dog fiercely thwarts any other animal’s
attempt to gain access to the hay in the manger—hay that has no practical value or use for the dog
itself. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 668 (1993) (defining a “dog in
the manger” as “a person who selfishly withholds from others something that he himself cannot
use or does not need.” The metaphor is derived from “the fable of the dog who would not allow a
horse or ox to eat the hay in the manger, even though he did not want it himself.”).
2. Although Part I of this Note discusses the history and intricacies of the IOLTA program
in detail, see infra notes 934 and accompanying text, a brief description is in order at this point.
IOLTA programs target attorney-held client funds that could not individually generate enough
interest to cover the costs of setting up and administering a separate account and require that
attorneys pool these deposits into interest-generating accounts for the benefit of state bar
foundations, which then direct the interest to providing legal services for the poor. Most often,
deposits are subject to IOLTA regulations because they are to be held for a short period or time,
are nominal in amount, or a combination of the two.
3. A.B.A. Commission on Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts, What is IOLTA?, at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/iolta/ioltback.html (last modified Apr. 4, 2002) [hereinafter
What is IOLTA?].
4. Robin Hood, in DISNEY’S TREASURY OF CHILDREN’S CLASSICS 88, 91–92 (spec. ed.,
1997).
5. Jarrod M. Mohler, Note, “And Justice For All” (Who Can Afford It): IOLTA’s Future in
Light of Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 118 S.Ct. 1925 (1998), 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 219,
227 (1999) (discussing criticism of IOLTA in the 1990s) (citations omitted).
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Opponents have been waging war on IOLTA programs since their
inception in the early 1980s.6 After twenty-five years7 of courtroom battles,
what progress has been made? Perhaps the only progress opponents of IOLTA
programs can claim is that a significant amount of IOLTA resources have been
diverted from providing legal aid for the poor to courtroom battles over the
constitutionality of the IOLTA program itself.
This Note explores the first twenty-five years of the war over IOLTA,
beginning with a brief description of the creation and mechanics of IOLTA in
Part II. Part III examines three major battlefields8 where the war between
IOLTA and its opponents has been or is likely to be waged. Finally, Part IV
analyzes potential solutions to the theoretical infirmities of IOLTA’s design.
II. GETTING UP TO SPEED ON IOLTA
A basic understanding of IOLTA’s creation and mechanics is valuable in
analyzing the current battlegrounds confronting IOLTA and in evaluating
possible solutions.
“Civil legal assistance for indigents in the United States began in New
York City in 1876 with the founding of the Legal Aid Society of New York.”9
It would not be presumptuous to assume that the chronic problem of providing
funding for legal aid programs was also born with the Legal Aid Society of
New York. The problem subsided when federal funds were used to support
legal aid programs, but not for long. In the early 1980s, political changes led
to drastic cuts in federal funding for legal aid services, and once again, legal
aid programs faced serious funding challenges.10

6. IOLTA programs became popular in the early 1980s; the first state to adopt such a
program was Florida in 1979. See What is IOLTA?, supra note 3.
7. From the first IOLTA program’s establishment in Florida in 1979 to 2004, IOLTA
programs have seen a number of fierce challenges. David J. Hrina, Comment, The Future of
IOLTA: Has the Death Knell been Sounded for Mandatory IOLTA Programs?, 32 AKRON L.
REV. 301, 303 (1999) (“Since their inception, IOLTAs have been highly controversial and under
constitutional attack.”). See also Keith H. Douglas, Note, IOLTAs Unmasked: Legal Aid
Programs’ Funding Results in Taking of Clients’’ Property, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1297, 1333 (1997)
(asserting that IOLTA programs are “quietly confiscating property from a dispersed political
minority”).
8. Traditionally, IOLTA programs have faced challenges based on claims of violation of
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Presently, IOLTA opponents are mounting First
Amendment Free Speech challenges. In the future, this note suggests, IOLTA is likely to see
challenges that construe the program as a tax. For more detailed discussion, see infra notes
35150 and accompanying text.
9. Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for Low-Income Persons: Looking Back and
Looking Forward, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1213, 1213 (2002) (describing the creation and
evolution of civil justice programs).
10. A reduction of (the 2001 equivalent of) more than $216 million federal dollars from the
Legal Services grant occurred from 1980-1990. Id. at 1221.
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States began looking for sources of funding to supplement the federal cuts,
and IOLTA emerged in the early 1980s as one of the most successful and
widespread alternative funding programs.11
Since at least the early part of the twentieth century, lawyers have been
ethically obligated not to mingle clients’ funds with their own.12 Attorneys
maintained separate accounts for client funds and generally pooled those client
funds that were small amounts to be held for a short period of time into one
account because the costs of opening and maintaining separate accounts did
not make individual accounts feasible.13 Pooled accounts were non-interest
bearing because federal banking laws prohibited the payment of interest on
demand deposit accounts, and therefore banks were essentially being given
interest-free loans by the pooled, non-interest bearing trust accounts.14
IOLTA programs began in the early 1980s, when a change in banking laws
coincided with drastic reductions in federal funding to legal services
corporations. In 1980, with the passage of the Consumer Checking Account
Equity Act (the “CCAEA”),15 the opportunity for IOLTA programs to flourish
arose. The CCAEA created Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (“NOW”)
accounts, which allowed federally insured banks to pay interest on qualified
checking accounts.16 NOW accounts could generate interest if “the entire
beneficial interest is held by one or more individuals or by an organization
which is operated primarily for religious, philanthropic, charitable,
educational, political, or other similar purposes and which is not operated for
profit . . . .”17
Desperate for a solution to their legal services funding woes, states took
advantage of this open invitation and began to create IOLTA programs. “The
purpose of IOLTA accounts is to give money to a worthwhile organization

11. James D. Anderson, Note, The Future of IOLTA: Solutions to Fifth Amendment Takings
Challenges Against IOLTA Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 717, 720 (1999) (proposing two
solutions for IOLTA programs to remain viable after the holding in Phillips).
12. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 236 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2001).
Most states’ IOLTA programs are created under the jurisdiction’s Rules of Professional Conduct,
typically Rule 1.15, which provides, “A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own
property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account . . . .” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.15(a) (2003).
13. What is IOLTA?, supra note 3.
14. Anderson, supra note 11, at 721.
15. 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000).
16. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 161 (1998); Wash. Legal Found. v.
Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 968 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing the changes to NOW accounts
with the passage of the CCAEA).
17. 12 U.S.C. §1832(a)(2).
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rather than to give an interest-free loan to a bank.”18 IOLTA programs
continue to pool short-term, small deposits into one account, but the
“difference is that with changes in the banking laws and the explicit permission
of federal regulators, banks may remit interest on these pooled accounts to a
not-for-profit organization: the IOLTA program[,]” which then distributes
funding to legal aid groups.19
The Florida Supreme Court established the first IOLTA program in the
United States in 1979.20 By 2000, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
had IOLTA programs in place, and IOLTA generated $148 million dollars
nationally in 2000.21 This number exceeded $200 million dollars in 2001.22
IOLTA-generated interest funds fifteen percent of the total legal aid bill for the
United States.23
Most IOLTA programs were created by order of the jurisdiction’s highest
court.24 In five states, IOLTA programs were created by the state legislature.25
18. Risa I. Sackmary, Comment, IOLTA’s Last Obstacle: Washington Legal Found. v.
Massachusetts Bar Found.’s Faulty Analysis of Attorney’s First Amendment Rights, 2 J.L. &
POL’Y 187, 188 (1994) (ultimately concluding that mandatory IOLTA programs which support
activities against attorneys’ political and ideological beliefs violate the attorneys’ First
Amendment rights).
19. What is IOLTA?, supra note 3.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Ronald D. Rotunda, Found Money: Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, and the
Taking of Property without Compensation, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 245, 248 (2002–2003).
23. Richard Tromans, Supreme Court Upholds Law Firm Legal Aid Subsidy, LEGAL WK,
Apr. 17, 2003.
24. A.B.A. Commission on Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Accounts, Current Status of IOLTA
Programs, at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/iolta/ioltus.html (last modified Apr. 4, 2002)
[hereinafter Current Status of IOLTA Programs]; See Ala. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d), (g)
(2004); Alaska Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d) (2003); Ariz. Sup. Ct. Rules R. 44(c)(2)
(2004); Ark. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d)(2) (2003); Colo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.
1.15(e) (2004); Del. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(h) (2004); D.C. Rules of Court R. 1.15
(2004); Fla. Bar R. 5-1.1 (2004); Ga. Bar R. 1.15(I) (2004); Haw. Sup. Ct. R. 11 (2004); Idaho
Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.15(d) (2004); Ill. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d) (2004); Ind. Rules
of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d) (2004); Iowa Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 9-102(C) (2004);
Kan. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d)(3) (2004); Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.15 (2004); La. Stat. Ann., Tit. 37, ch. 4, App., Art. 16, Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.
1.15(d) (West 2004); Me. Code of Prof’l Responsibility R. 3.6(e)(4) (2004); Mass. Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.15 (2004); Mich. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d) (2004); Minn. Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.15(d) (2004); Miss. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d), (e) (2004); Mo. Sup. Ct.
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4-1.15(d) (2004); Mont. Rule Prof’l Conduct 1.18(b) (2004); Neb.
Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 9-102 (2004); Nev. Sup. Ct. Rules R. 217 (2004); N.H. Sup. Ct.
Rules R. 50 (2004); N.J. Rules Gen. Application R. 1:28A-2 (2004); N.M. Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 16-115(D) (2004); N.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15-4 (2004); N.D. Rules of
Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d)(1) (2004); Okla. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d) (2004); Or. Code
of Prof’l Responsibility DR9-101(D)(2) (2004); Pa. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d) (2004); R.
I. Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Art. V, 1.15(d) (2004); S.C. App. Ct. Rule 407 (2004); S.D. Tit. 16,
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IOLTA programs fall into three categories: mandatory, opt-out, and
voluntary. In mandatory programs, all lawyers in the jurisdiction who
maintain client trust accounts must participate.26 In opt-out programs, lawyers
must participate unless they affirmatively choose not to participate (default is
participation).27 In voluntary programs, the default rule is non-participation,

ch. 16-18, App., Rules of Prof’l. Conduct R. 1.15(d), (e) (2004); Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rule 8, Code of
Prof’l Responsibility R. 1.15 (2004); Tex. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.14 (2004); Utah Sup. Ct.
Rules, Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15 (2004); Vt. Rules of,Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15 (2004); Va.
Sup. Ct. Rules, pt. 6, § II, Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15 (2004); Wash. Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 1.14 (2004); W. Va. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d) (2004); Wis. Sup. Ct. Rules R. 20:1.15
(2004); Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.15(d) (2004). See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3915.1
(2004) (Virginia legislature overriding state Supreme Court rules and making lawyer participation
in the IOLTA program optional rather than mandatory). See also In re Public Law No. 154-1990,
561 N.E.2d 791 (1990) (striking down legislative IOLTA program as encroachment on the
court’s power to regulate the practice of law); IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d) (2000)
(Indiana Supreme Court adopting an IOLTA program of its own); Alfred J. Azen, Building a
Base for Pro Bono in Pennsylvania, 24 Apr. Pa. Law. 28 (Mar.-Apr. 2002) (discussing the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s suspension of the Pennsylvania statute creating IOLTA and
amending the Rules of Professional Conduct to require attorney participation in IOLTA).
25. Current Status of IOLTA Programs, supra note 24. California, Connecticut, Maryland,
New York, and Ohio’s programs were created by state statutes. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
ANN. § 6211(a) (2004); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (2004); MD. CODE ANN.
BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 10-303 (2004); N. Y. JUD. LAW § 497 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4705.09(A)(1) (2004).
26. Current Status of IOLTA Programs, supra note 24. As of May 2003, twenty-eight
jurisdictions had mandatory programs: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. An example of a
mandatory participation rule is Illinois’ Rule 1.15(d):
(d) All nominal or short-term funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, including
advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more pooled interest-bearing
trust accounts established with a bank or savings and loan association, with the Lawyers
Trust Fund of Illinois designated as income beneficiary. Each pooled, interest bearing
trust account shall comply with the following provisions:
(1) Each lawyer or law firm shall establish one or more interest-bearing trust
accounts . . . .
....
(2) Each lawyer or law firm shall direct the depository institution to remit net
interest or dividends, after deduction of reasonable charges and
fees . . .directly to the Lawyers Trust Fund of Illinois . . . .
(3) Each lawyer or law firm shall deposit into such interest-bearing trust
accounts all clients’ funds which are nominal in amount or are expected to
be held for a short period of time.
ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d) (2002).
27. Current Status of IOLTA Programs, supra note 24. Twenty-two jurisdictions had optout programs as of May 2003: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
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and lawyers must affirmatively choose to participate.28 Most states have a
mandatory program.29
It is the lawyer, rather than the client, who is charged with deciding
whether a particular deposit is subject to IOLTA regulations.30 The factors to
be considered include:

Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and
Wyoming. Id. An example of an opt-out rule is Missouri’s Rule 1.15(d) and (f):
(b) . . . a lawyer or law firm shall establish and maintain one or more interestbearing insured depository accounts into which shall be deposited all funds of
clients or third persons that are nominal in amount or are expected to be held for
a short period of time . . . .
....
(f) A lawyer or law firm may elect to decline to maintain accounts as described in
paragraph (d) by so notifying the Missouri Lawyer Trust Account Foundation in
writing on or before January 31 of any year. A lawyer or law firm that does not
so advise the Missouri Lawyer Trust Account Foundation shall be required to
maintain such accounts.
MO. SUP. CT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.15(d), (f) (2002).
28. Current Status of IOLTA Programs, supra note 24. As of May 2003, voluntary
programs exist in only two jurisdictions: South Dakota and the Virgin Islands. Id. An example
of a voluntary rule is South Dakota’s Rule 1.15(d)(3):
A lawyer may elect to create and maintain an interest-bearing account for clients’ funds
which are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time in compliance with
the following provisions:
(i) No earnings from such an account shall be made available to a lawyer or firm.
(ii) The account shall include all clients’ funds which are nominal in amount to be held
for a shortperiod of time.
(iii) An interest-bearing trust account may be established with any bank authorized by
federal or state law to do business in South Dakota and insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Funds in each interest-bearing trust account shall
be subject to withdrawal upon request and without delay.
(iv) The rate of interest payable on any interest payable on any interest-bearing trust
account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depository institution to regular,
nonlawyer depositors unless reduced to offset bank administrative costs. Higher
rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time or
quantity minima, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be
obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of deposit funds so long as there is
no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.
S.D. TIT. 16, CH. 16-18, APP., RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.15(d)(3) (2004).
29. Current Status of IOLTA Programs, supra note 24.
30. For an example, see ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d)(5) (2004).
(5) The decision as to whether funds are nominal in amount or are expected to be held
fora short period of time rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the lawyer or
law firm,and no charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional
conduct shall attenda lawyer’s or law firm’s judgment on what is nominal or short
term.
Id.
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(1) the amount of interest which the funds would earn during
the period they are expected to be deposited;
(2) the cost of establishing and administering the account,
including the cost of the lawyer’s services;
(3) the capability of the financial institution, through
subaccounting, to calculate and pay interest earned by
each client’s funds, net of any transaction costs, to the
individual client.31
In summary, in the majority of the states, an order from the highest state
court mandates that lawyers deposit client funds that could not generate net
interest if separately held into pooled trust accounts and requires that the
lawyer designate the state’s IOLTA program as the beneficiary of the pooled
account. Proponents argue that funding legal aid programs is essential because
“[p]roviding those in poverty with free or low-cost legal advocates assures
them equal access to the justice system and is one of the most effective means
of alleviating economic oppression”32 and hail these programs as a “creative
and lucrative solution”33 to the funding problem. Opponents of the IOLTA
program argue that “[w]hile the goals of this program are worthy, the
mechanism is unconstitutional.”34
III. THREE MAJOR BATTLEFIELDS FOR IOLTA
Three battlefields currently exist for attacking IOLTA. Challenges to
IOLTA programs based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment35 have
been by far the most active of the IOLTA battles.36 A second battlefield is
heating up, with challenges based on the Free Speech Clause of the First

31. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(e)(1)-(3) (2004).
32. Emily C. Helms, Note, Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of
Washington: Why The Supreme Court Should Protect Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts From
Takings Challenges, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 289, 311 (2003) (arguing that the Court should
hold, in Brown, that the Fifth Amendment has not been violated because no just compensation
was due).
33. Id.
34. Kristi L. Darnell, Note, Pennies From Heaven—Why Washington Legal Foundation v.
Legal Foundation of Washington Violates the U.S. Constitution, 77 WASH. L. REV. 775, 775
(2002) (arguing that IOLTA should be declared unconstitutional as a taking without just
compensation and suggesting client consent as a constitutionally valid alternative).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing, “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation”).
36. Mohler, supra note 5, at 225 n.54 (“The most consistent and seriously treated of the
constitutional complaints, however, is a Fifth Amendment ‘taking’ claim applied through the
Fourteenth Amendment, the assertion that some client property is infringed when interest from a
pooled IOLTA account is funneled to public purposes.”).
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Amendment.37 The potential for a third battlefield exists, where IOLTA
programs would be challenged as functionally equivalent to a tax, yet not in
conformity with general tax doctrines.
A.

Takings Clause Challenges to IOLTA

Two recent Supreme Court cases addressed challenges to IOLTA based on
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Initially, after Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation,38 it appeared that IOLTA programs would lose
the war and be declared unconstitutional in the near future. However, a bare
majority of the Court rallied in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington39 to
surprise IOLTA proponents by turning the tide of the battle.
This section considers, in turn, the holdings and rationale for Phillips and
for Brown, and then shifts focus to the future of Fifth Amendment claims
against IOLTA.
1.

Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation

A Texas businessman named William Summers deposited a retainer with
Attorney Michael Mazzone in connection with legal work Mazzone was
performing for Summers.40 Mazzone, in turn, deposited the retainer into an
IOLTA fund. 41 Summers learned in January of 1994 that the interest his
deposit earned would go to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation42
(“TEAJF”), rather than being returned to him.43 In February of 1994,
Summers, Mazzone, and the Washington Legal Foundation filed suit against
the TEAJF, its chairman, and the Justices of the Texas Supreme Court,

37. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”).
38. 524 U.S. 156 (1998). The Washington Legal Foundation (“WLF”) is a non-profit
activist group dedicated to promoting free enterprise, and its mission is “to defend and promote
the principles of freedom and justice.” Washington Legal Foundation, WLF Mission, at
http://www.wlf.org/Resources/WLFMission/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
39. 538 U.S. 216 (2003). Not to be confused with the similarly named opponents of IOLTA
(the WLF, see supra, note 38), The Legal Foundation of Washington (“LFW”) is the legal
services arm of the Bar Association of the State of Washington. LFW’s Mission Statement
provides “The Legal Foundation of Washington is dedicated to the provision of equal access to
the justice system by funding legal and educational programs for low-income persons through the
fair and efficient administration of IOLTA and other funds.” Legal Foundation of Washington, at
http://www.legalfoundation.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
40. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 163.
41. Id.
42. Id. The Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation is a non-profit corporation created by
the Texas Supreme Court to provide legal services to the poor. Id. at 162.
43. Id. at 163.
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claiming that the Texas IOLTA program violated the Fifth Amendment by
taking property without just compensation.44
The District Court found that the plaintiffs did not have a property interest
in the income generated by the principal held in IOLTA accounts and granted
summary judgment for the TEAJF.45 However, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that “any interest that accrues belongs to the owner
of the principal.”46 TEAJF petitioned the Supreme Court, and the Court
granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
as to whether interest generated by IOLTA deposits was the private property of
the owner of the principal.47
In Phillips, the Court began by setting out that the Constitution merely
protects, rather than creates, private property interests, and therefore property
interests must be independently created.48 For interest income, the Court found
this source of independent creation in the state common law rule that “interest
follows principal.”49
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist was not persuaded by the
petitioners’ argument that the general rule should be abandoned in cases where
the principal could not generate the interest on its own, as with the client funds
in IOLTA accounts.50 Although the petitioners distinguished interest from net
interest, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that the distinction was irrelevant
because of the Court’s “longstanding recognition that property is more than
economic value,” 51 that it includes “the right to possess, use, and dispose,” 52
and “[w]hile the interest income at issue here may have no economically
realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition are
nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the property.”53 Having rejected this
argument in earlier takings cases, the Court also turned a deaf ear to the
petitioners’ argument that the interest is not the private property of the owners
of the principal because the interest was created by the state’s IOLTA

44. Id.
45. Wash. Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. 1, 7, 11
(W.D. Tex. 1995).
46. Wash. Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996, 1004 (5th
Cir. 1996).
47. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 163.
48. Id. at 164.
49. Id. at 165. “The rule that ‘interest follows principal’ has been established under English
common law since at least the mid-1700s. . . . This rule has become firmly embedded in the
common law of the various States.” Id. (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 169.
51. Id. at 170.
52. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170 (citation omitted).
53. Id.
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program.54 “[T]he State’s having mandated the accrual of interest does not
mean the State or its designate is entitled to assume ownership of that
interest[,]”55 as “the State does nothing to create value; the value is created by
respondents’ funds.”56
The theory underlying Phillips is that property includes not only ownership
of the actual thing but also the rights of control, use, and dispossession, and
that those rights are incidents of ownership of the thing. Included in this
theory is the idea that the economic value of the thing or one of the rights
incidental to it does not affect its status as private property.
Viewing property as not only ownership of the physical thing but also the
rights of control, use, and dispossession, Phillips confirms the rule that
“interest follows principal” and therefore clearly holds that “the interest
income generated by funds held in IOLTA accounts is the ‘private property’ of
the owner of the principal.”57 Phillips distinctly rejects the idea that whether
the interest is property is conditioned upon (1) whether the interest would
represent positive economic value if taken as a net amount, and (2) whether the
interest could have been created but for the state mandated program.
Phillips did not address the other elements of a Takings Clause challenge
but simply answered the question before it: that the interest earned by deposits
in IOLTA programs was the private property of the owner of the principal.
Accordingly, the Court remanded the questions of taking and just
compensation to the District Court.58
Washington Legal Foundation was declared the winner,59 and IOLTA
opponents celebrated. “While the final nail has not been pounded into the
IOLTA coffin, the next to last one has.”60 Tasting victory over IOLTA
programs, opponents claimed, “mandatory IOLTA programs are on the verge
of being declared unconstitutional and . . . states will need to consider
alternative sources of money to fill the funding void left in the wake of
IOLTA’s apparent demise.”61 Not ready to admit defeat, proponents of the
program denounced the Court’s decision as “turn[ing] nearly twenty years of

54. Id. at 170–71. The argument that “government-created value” made the interest the
property of the state rather than the owner of the principal was rejected by the Court in Webb’s
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). Id. at 171.
55. Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 162.
56. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 171.
57. Id. at 172.
58. Id.
59. Scorecard: Winners, Losers in Term’s Key Cases, THE NAT’L L.J., Aug. 10, 1998, at B9
(declaring Washington Legal Foundation to be the winner in Phillips).
60. IOLTA May Be Invalid—U.S. Supreme Court, LAW. WKLY. USA, June 29, 1998, at 2
(quoting Richard Samp, Washington Legal Foundation Chief Counsel, commenting on the
Court’s recent ruling in Phillips).
61. Hrina, supra note 7, at 303.
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IOLTA jurisprudence upside down[,]”62 on the mild side, and “trampl[ing]
upon precedent, the Fifth Amendment and good sense,”63 “completely
avoid[ing] the real issue of the case,”64 and “[a]ffect[ing] literally millions
of . . . Americans who . . . may be denied access to the judicial system as a
result of this ruling”65 on the more outspoken end of the spectrum. Reacting to
the Phillips holding, one commentator suggested that “[i]n the end, the true
victims are those who must rely on subsidized legal assistance when legal
problems arise”66 because loss of IOLTA funding would translate into a drastic
reduction in subsidized legal assistance.
But, in March of 2003, IOLTA proponents had their own victory day
before the Court.
2.

Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington67

The Fifth Amendment allows a taking of private property, so long as two
conditions are met: The taking must be for public use, and just compensation
must be paid.68 Phillips considered the preliminary question, whether the
interest in IOLTA programs even qualifies as private property. The Phillips
Court answered affirmatively but did not tackle the remainder of the Takings
Clause analysis. Three questions remained: Does IOLTA work a taking of this
private property interest?69 Is that taking for public use? And if so, what just

62. Jason Lacey, Note, IOLTA Programs and Professional Responsibility: Dealing with the
Aftermath of Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 47 KAN. L. REV. 911, 926 (1999)
(ultimately arguing that continued participation in mandatory IOLTA programs after Phillips
violates lawyers’ ethical duties).
63. Mohler, supra note 5, at 237 (footnote omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Lacey, supra note 62, at 934. The author continues:
If funding for legal service organizations is allowed to fall by the wayside, many people
may be denied access to a legal system that is designed to aid and protect them. For them,
the system would be meaningless, and to that end, the rule of law itself may become
meaningless as well. As a matter of professional responsibility, the legal community has
a duty to see that does not happen.
Id. at 934–35.
67. 538 U.S. 216 (2003). When it reached the Ninth Circuit, the case was perplexingly
styled Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington. The Ninth Circuit
determined that two of the four named petitioners and the Washington Legal Foundation lacked
standing to bring Fifth Amendment challenges. Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash.,
271 F.3d 835, 850 (9th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court, when it issued its decision, renamed the
case Allen Brown and Greg Hayes v. Legal Foundation of Washington, apparently agreeing with
the Ninth Circuit’s judgment that the other parties lacked standing. Brown, 538 U.S. at 228.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing, “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation”).
69. In Brown, Justice Stevens writes for the majority, that in Phillips, “[w]e did not,
however, express any opinion on the question whether the income had been ‘taken’ by the State

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

616

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:605

compensation is due?70 The Court’s refusal to answer these lingering
questions made them ripe ground for another round of IOLTA battles. Brown
was decided by the Court on March 26, 2003.71
Petitioners Allen Brown and Greg Hayes each placed escrow funds for the
purchase of real estate into IOLTA accounts in the state of Washington, and
the net interest on those funds was paid to the Legal Foundation of Washington
pursuant to the state’s IOLTA rules.72 In the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, the petitioners73 brought suit against the Legal
Foundation of Washington and the Justices of the Washington Supreme Court,
claiming that the IOLTA program violated two of their constitutional rights:
the right not to have property taken without just compensation, as protected by
the Fifth Amendment, and the right not to be compelled to speak, as protected
by the First Amendment.74 Ruling before the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Phillips, the District Court dismissed the petitioners’ claims on
summary judgment, holding that there could be no First or Fifth Amendment
violations because the IOLTA interest was not private property.75 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision shortly after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips was announced.76 Ruling that IOLTA
interest was private property and that IOLTA programs’ appropriation of that
interest was a per se taking, the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue of just
compensation to the District Court.77
Rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit refused to find a per se taking when
real property was not at issue, and instead employed an ad hoc78 analysis.79
Under the ad hoc analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that IOLTA programs were
or ‘as to the amount of “just compensation,” if any, due respondents.’ We now confront those
questions.” Brown, 538 U.S. at 220 (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172
(1998)).
70. Brown, 538 U.S. at 220. The question of just compensation would be the Court’s main
focus in Brown. See id.
71. Id. at 216.
72. Id. at 229–30. Washington’s IOLTA program was created by order of the Washington
Supreme Court. See supra, note 24. For Washington’s IOLTA rules, see WASH. RULES OF PROF.
CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2002).
73. Brown and Hayes were joined by two limited practice officers, also governed by the
state’s IOLTA rules, and the Washington Legal Foundation. Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found.
of Wash., 236 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2001). Washington Legal Foundation and the limited
practice officers’ takings clause claims were later dismissed for lack of standing. Wash. Legal
Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 848–50 (9th Cir. 2001).
74. Brown, 538 U.S. at 228–29. See also Wash. Legal Found., 271 F.3d at 845–46.
75. Wash. Legal Found., 271 F.3d at 846.
76. Wash. Legal Found., 236 F.3d at 1105–09, 1115.
77. Id. at 1111–15.
78. The ad hoc analysis was promulgated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978).
79. Wash. Legal Found., 271 F.3d at 856–57.
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not a taking, and even if IOLTA did amount to a taking, the Fifth Amendment
was not violated because no just compensation was due.80 The Ninth Circuit
measured just compensation by what the owner had lost, not what the taker had
gained, and reasoned that all the petitioners had lost was the “right to let their
principal lie fallow.”81 Brown and Hayes petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari. The Court granted the writ to resolve a split between the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits as to (1) whether an ad hoc or per se analysis should
be applied in determining whether IOLTA resulted in a taking and (2) whether
IOLTA resulted in a taking for which just compensation was due. 82
Ultimately, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s en banc ruling.83
The Supreme Court addressed all the elements of a Takings Clause claim,
despite the fact that the writ did not mention the public use requirement.84
Having held in Phillips that IOLTA interest was private property,85 the Court
made short work of the public use requirement. The majority easily concluded
that “the overall, dramatic success of these programs in serving the compelling
interest in providing legal services to literally millions of needy Americans
certainly qualifies the Foundation’s distribution of these funds as a ‘public use’
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”86
The Brown opinion became most interesting, however, as the Court took
up the confluence of the just compensation requirement and its takings
jurisprudence. Distinguishing physical takings87 from regulatory takings,88 the

80. Id. at 861–62.
81. Id. at 862–63.
82. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 857–58 (9th Cir.
2001), cert. granted, 536 U.S. 903 (2002) (applying the ad hoc test from Penn Central to find that
IOLTA did not result in a taking). See also Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice
Found., 270 F.3d 180, 188–89 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying the per se test from Loretto to find that
IOLTA did result in a taking).
83. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 241 (2003).
84. Dissenting in Brown, Justice Scalia criticizes the majority for addressing a
“nonjurisdictional constitutional issue raised by neither the parties nor their amici. Petitioners’
sole contention in this Court is that the State’s IOLTA program violates the just compensation
requirement of the Takings Clause.” Id. at 243 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
86. Brown, 538 U.S. at 232.
87. A physical taking occurs when the government takes physical possession of a portion or
entire parcel of property. An example is when the government puts a cable television receptor
box on the rooftop of an apartment building, physically occupying a portion of the privately
owned parcel. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982). For
physical takings, a per se rule is applied. Brown, 538 U.S. at 233–34.
88. A regulatory taking occurs when government regulations prohibit certain uses of private
property. An example is a governmental ban on private use of certain airspace. Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128 (1978) (citations omitted). For regulatory
takings, an ad hoc approach is applied, and in order for a taking to have occurred, there must have

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

618

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:605

Court concluded that IOLTA programs are akin to a physical taking.89 As
Phillips held that the interest earned in IOLTA accounts “is the ‘private
property’ of the owner of the principal[,]”90 the Brown Court found that the
taking of interest from IOLTA accounts was appropriately analogized to the
taking of a small amount of rooftop space in Loretto91 and determined that the
per se analysis should apply.92 Brown clearly sets out that IOLTA accounts
result in a per se taking.93
Addressing the final question, how to measure the just compensation due,
the majority reiterated that just compensation is “measured by the property
owner’s loss rather than the government’s gain.”94 However, the majority also
specified that only pecuniary losses are compensable, relying on Justice
Frankfurter’s opinion in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States95 that “an
owner’s nonpecuniary losses attributable to his unique need for property or
idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss due to an exercise of the police power,
is properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship.”96Justice
Stevens wrote, “it is clear that neither Brown nor Hayes is entitled to any
compensation for the nonpecuniary consequences of the taking of the interest
on his deposited funds, and that any pecuniary compensation must be
measured by his net losses rather than the value of the public’s gain.”97 In the
words of one practitioner, “[m]aybe we can call this the ‘no harm, no foul’
rule.”98
Justice Stevens and the majority in Brown justified IOLTA by setting the
baseline for measuring pecuniary loss as the owner’s opportunities to earn
interest outside of IOLTA programs.99 “[T]he private party ‘is entitled to be
been an “adverse economic impact” or “interfer[ence] with [an] investment-backed expectation.”
Brown, 538 U.S. at 234.
89. Brown, 538 U.S. at 235.
90. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998).
91. Brown, 538 U.S. at 235. See also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
92. Although the Ninth Circuit en banc decision applied an ad hoc analysis and the Supreme
Court applied the per se analysis, both Courts reached the same ultimate conclusion that the Fifth
Amendment was not violated because the just compensation due was zero. See Brown, 538 U.S.
at 239–40; Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2001).
93. The “interest was taken for a public use when it was ultimately turned over to the
Foundation[,]” that funds legal services. Brown, 538 U.S. at 235.
94. Id. at 235–36.
95. 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
96. Brown, 538 U.S. at 236–37 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 237. Justice Stevens and the majority are relying on a premise set forth by Justice
Holmes in Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910) (“[T]he question
is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.”).
98. Dwight H. Merriam, Panning for Gold in the Trickle of Supreme Court Cases this Term:
What Can We Learn from the IOLTA and Referendum Cases?, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., June
2003, at 1, 1 (discussing the impact of the Brown decision on Takings law).
99. Brown, 538 U.S. at 239.
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put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. He
must be made whole but is not entitled to more.’”100 Further, Brown measures
the just compensation by the net interest that would have been earned in a nonIOLTA account, not the gross interest that could have been earned.101 By the
very construct of IOLTA, the owner’s opportunities to earn net interest in a
separate, individual account must be zero.102 Therefore, according to the
majority, when the interest is taken, the just compensation due is zero, and
thus, there is no violation of the Fifth Amendment.103
Brown sets out two methods of measuring just compensation: first, by
discounting the interest earned on the principal when deposited in a pooled
account by the interest that would have been earned on the same principal had
the state not coerced its deposit into a pooled account, or what the State gives it
may take away, and second, by the net interest that could have been earned had
the funds been deposited into a non-IOLTA account, which by definition of
eligible IOLTA deposits, must be zero.104 Under either method, the majority
concluded that the compensation due was zero.105 Despite paying lip service to
the holding of Phillips, that interest is the private property of the owner of the
principal, the majority in Brown appears to have reasoned that although it is
private property, there is no compensation due if the interest is “created” by the
State because it provides the opportunity for owners to deposit their principal
into interest-generating IOLTA accounts. Alternatively, the Brown Court
qualified the holding in Phillips to state that only the net interest generated by
the principal is private property. Both of these arguments were distinctly
rejected by the majority in Phillips.106
Dissenting in Brown, Justice Scalia was critical of the theory adopted by
the majority, stating,
Perhaps we are witnessing today the emergence of a whole new concept in
Compensation Clause jurisprudence: the Robin Hood Taking, in which the
government’s extraction of wealth from those who own it is so cleverly
achieved, and the object of the government’s larcenous beneficence is so
highly favored by the courts (taking from the rich to give to indigent
defendants) that the normal rules of the Constitution protecting private
property are suspended.107

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 236 (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
Brown, 538 U.S. at 239–40.
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 239–40.
Id. at 235–37.
See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
Brown, 538 U.S. at 252 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia’s main criticism of the majority is that the holding departs from
the precedent of Phillips and other just compensation cases,108 which would
require that the measure of “just compensation owed to former owners of
confiscated property is the fair market value of the property taken[,]”109 which
for IOLTA programs is easily measured as the interest accrued. He also
believed that the majority’s holding “embrace[d] a line of reasoning that we
explicitly rejected in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,”110 and
“contravene[d] our decision in Phillips—effectively refusing to treat the
interest as the property of petitioners we held it to be . . . .”111 Scalia chastised
the majority for holding, in his opinion, that “there is no taking when ‘the State
giveth, and the State taketh away.’”112 Yet despite his criticisms of the
majority, Scalia also begged the question that the only basis for measuring just
compensation is the lost interest.
The question is indeed more difficult than Scalia treated it in his dissent. It
is not a given that the appropriate measure of damages in IOLTA takings cases
should be solely the lost interest. If property includes the rights to “possess,
use or dispose,” as in the theory behind the holding in Phillips, then to base
just compensation for IOLTA takings solely on the amount of interest lost is a
fallacy.
3.

The Future of Takings Clause Challenges

Despite how recently the Brown decision was handed down, it is already
drawing criticism from scholars. “[T]he constitutionality of IOLTA programs
nationwide—whose possible demise distressed social justice advocates
precisely because those programs are a vital source of funding for legal
services—now rests on the dubious proposition that the more than $200
million that these programs generate annually is actually worth nothing.”113
Given the sharp division among the current Court over how to measure just
compensation for IOLTA takings and the fact that both Brown and Phillips
were 5-4 decisions, there does appear to be room for future litigation on
IOLTA and Takings Clause issues. However, it will be an uphill battle for
IOLTA opponents, who face the daunting task of convincing the Court that it
made a mistake and cannot reconcile the Brown decision with the precedent it
established in Phillips. Opponents who continue the takings assault on IOLTA

108. Id. at 241.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 242–43.
112. Brown, 538 U.S. at 247.
113. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, 117 HARV. L. REV.
369, 379 (2003) (footnote omitted).
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will find four allies on the current court,114 but the challenge will be in finding
the fifth ally. There may be some hope in convincing Justice O’Connor to
switch sides, as she was the “swing” fifth vote in both Phillips and Brown,
voting with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and the Chief Justice in Phillips
but apparently switching sides by the time Brown came before the Court.115
Another glimmer of hope for IOLTA proponents on the Fifth Amendment
front turns on a vacancy on the Supreme Court that could result in the
appointment of a conservative or moderate Justice who would be more likely
to uphold property rights and vote with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Rehnquist on IOLTA issues. While certainly not based on much more than a
hope and a prayer,116 the National Center for the Public Interest, a pro-IOLTA
group, comments that “the only major five-to-four holdings in civil cases that
would be endangered by virtue of a one-justice ideological shift would be
those dealing with IOLTA . . . .”117
While IOLTA opponents could continue the takings assault, there are other
battles to wage against IOLTA, battles where the odds are more favorable for
opponents of the program.
B.

First Amendment Challenges to IOLTA

“O’Melveny & Myers D.C. partner Walter Dellinger, the former acting
solicitor general who argued in favor of IOLTA on behalf of the Washington
State Supreme Court, said the [Brown] ruling ‘as a practical matter settles once
and for all the hugely important issue of legal funding for the poor.’”118 But
does it?

114. The dissenters in Brown were Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 241 (2003).
115. For the proposition that Justice O’Connor was the key swing vote, see generally Frank
Newton, IOLTA’s Final Fate: A first Hand Account of the U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments,
TEX. LAWYER, Dec. 23, 2002, at 70. There is also reason to believe that Justice O’Connor could
be persuaded to consider the constitutionality of IOLTA programs in light of the Due Process
claims. See Tony Mauro, IOLTA Opponents Receive Grilling, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 16, 2002, at
1 (commenting on oral arguments in Brown, “O’Connor seemed dubious, suggesting several
times that ‘there might be a due process argument’ against IOLTA, but not one based on the Fifth
Amendment just compensation clause[]”).
116. National Legal Center for the Public Interest, The Supreme Court’s 2002-2003 Term in
Review, 24 JUD./LEGIS. WATCH REP., Oct. 2003, at 1, 1 (“[I]t was a Term that satisfied almost no
one. On the Right, one televangelist encouraged his listeners to pray for a vacancy on the U.S.
Supreme Court—a vacancy that presumably would occur only through the death or illness of a
sitting justice.”).
117. Id. at 2.
118. Tony Mauro, IOLTA Programs Narrowly Saved, CONN. L. TRIB. Mar. 31, 2003, at 1.
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A second battlefield for IOLTA programs exists, and it is likely IOLTA
will see new challenges focusing on First Amendment grounds.119 “It’s a
pretty well established [U.S.] Supreme Court rule that, outside the area of
taxes, you may not require somebody to contribute funds to something they
don’t support,” Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation, Richard
Samp commented.120
First Amendment challenges have typically attacked mandatory IOLTA
programs121 on the premise that “the states’ use of the interest earned on
IOLTAs forces them to support ideological or political organizations they find
to be offensive and in violation of both the right to free speech and the right to
Washington Legal Foundation’s First
freedom of association . . . .”122
Amendment argument “has been that, in general, litigation is something that is
an expressive activity and to force people to finance activities, some of which
they may find objectionable, violates the First Amendment.”123
In earlier compelled support cases,124 the Court acknowledged Thomas
Jefferson’s view that, “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for
the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.”125
Requiring citizens to fund speech they find to be repugnant has been held to be
a violation of the First Amendment,126 as has requiring owners to allow their
property to be used by those who engage in speech repugnant to the owner.127
IOLTA opponents construct their First Amendment claim from these two
holdings, arguing that it is a violation of the First Amendment for the
government to “require a citizen to lend his property to others for the purpose

119. Hrina, supra note 7, at 326. “Even if IOLTAs somehow emerge intact from the
immediate threat . . . under the Fifth Amendment, they will undoubtedly be challenged again on
First Amendment grounds, now that the United States Supreme Court has declared that a client
has a property interest in IOLTA generated interest.” Id. (footnote omitted).
120. Jerry Crimmins, Key Legal Aid Funding Program Now Two Decades Old, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., June 12, 2003, at 1.
121. For a listing of states with mandatory IOLTA programs, see supra note 26.
122. Hrina, supra note 7, at 311.
123. Marcia Coyle, Battle over IOLTA Could be Renewed: Using Funds for Indigent Clients
Might be Seen as “Compelled Speech”, NAT’L. L.J., Mar. 31, 2003, at A5 (quoting Richard
Samp, Chief Counsel to Washington Legal Foundation).
124. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n,
500 U.S. 507 (1991); Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986);
Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209 (1977); Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); Ry.
Employees’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
125. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235 n.31 (quoting I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST
354 (1948)).
126. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234–35.
127. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986).
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of raising money to fund speech objectionable to the property owner.”128 The
fact that the property compelled to be lent in IOLTA programs is personal
property rather than real property does not change the analysis.129
Although both district court cases leading up to Phillips and Brown
initially alleged First Amendment violations in addition to their Fifth
Amendment claims,130 the respective district courts concluded that because
IOLTA interest was not private property, there could be no compelled support
and thus no violation of the First Amendment.131 Phillips’ holding destroys the
128. Matthew Davis, Comment, Can the Ends Justify The Means? Illinois Lawyers Trust
Fund: A Constitutional Analysis, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 693, 707–08 (1999) (discussing First and Fifth
Amendment Challenges to IOLTA and ultimately concluding that IOLTA does violate the Fifth
Amendment).
129. For an interesting hypothetical illustrating this point, see id. at 708–09.
Consider a hypothetical analogous to IOLTA programs which requires only nominal
or short term funds to be placed in a pooled account for the purpose of generating interest
to fund various legal charities: O is the Owner of a vacant lot across the street from his
residence. The lot is very small, only ten feet by ten feet, and far too small for O to have
any reasonable expectation of using it to generate commercial income. O’s state
government passes a resolution which forces O to allow the government to use O’s vacant
lot for holding a government auction to sell off cars it has collected from various drug
raids. By itself, O’s lot is far too small to stage such an event, but the lot happens to be
adjacent to 100 other vacant lots owned by O’s neighbors. Of course, the state
government’s resolution also requires O’s neighbors to surrender their vacant lots for the
event as well. Using all the neighborhood’s ‘pooled’ vacant lots, the government auction
is a smashing success and the government raises a great deal of money which it gives to
XYZ Family Planning Clinic which provides obstetric care, including abortions, to poor
citizens at a reduced cost. O opposes abortion in any form as a matter of religious
conviction. O claims no property interest in the income generated by the auction.
The issue raised by the hypothetical is whether O has been compelled to speak in a
manner violating the First Amendment. O has been required to lend his property for the
purpose of generating income to fund objectionable speech. Certainly, O’s rights under
the First Amendment have been violated, notwithstanding the argument that his property
was too small to generate any income on its own . . . . The same arguments are raised by
proponents of IOLTA and, for the same reasons, they must fail. . . . Since the
emphasis . . . is on the ideological support of an objectionable cause, no distinction can be
offered to distinguish a client’s contribution of his principal to be used to generate interest
to fund objectionable speech. The result is identical [sic] his property is used to further a
cause with which he disagrees.
Id.
130. “In Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation—the
district court case leading up to the Supreme Court decision in Phillips—clients alleged that
mandatory IOLTA participation forced them to support and associate with organizations funded
by the IOLTA program.” Katharine L. Smith, Recent Development, IOLTA in the Balance: The
Battle of Legality and Morality Between Robin Hood and the Miser, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 969,
1000 (2003). In their original action, Brown and Hayes alleged that IOLTA programs violated
their First Amendment rights. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
131. See Hrina, supra note 7, at 312–14 (discussing the respective district courts’ handling of
the First Amendment claims).
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district courts’ reasoning, that the interest was not private property and
therefore could not constitute compelled speech, as a basis for finding that
there was no violation of the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, by the time these cases reached the appellate level, the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits and the Supreme Court focused on the Fifth Amendment
issues and largely ignored the First Amendment claims. However, dissenting
in Brown, Justice Kennedy hypothesized that the Court would one day be
confronted with the First Amendment issues surrounding IOLTA and
suggested: “One constitutional violation (the taking of property) likely will
lead to another (compelled speech). These matters may have to come before
the Court in due course.”132
Are IOLTA opponents ready to challenge IOLTA on First Amendment
grounds?Another full-scale constitutional challenge would certainly be a
prolonged and strenuous campaign.133 One commentator suggests that “the
long road to Brown may have dissuaded a new attack. Chief Counsel for the
Washington Legal Foundation, Richard Samp, stated that ‘it was not clear’ if
the First Amendment challenge would be pursued.”134 Yet given the ferocity
and determination with which the Washington Legal Foundation argued all the
way to the Supreme Court over $4.96,135 IOLTA proponents would be welladvised not to let their guard down on the First Amendment front.136

132. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 253 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
By mandating that the interest from these accounts serve causes the justices of the
Washington Supreme Court prefer, the State not only takes property in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States but also grants
to itself a monopoly which might then be used for the forced support of certain
viewpoints. . . . [whereas] the free market might have created various and diverse funds
for pooling small interest amounts.
Id.
133. James Burling, of the Pacific Legal Foundation, who filed an amicus brief supporting the
Washington Legal Foundation, commented on the difficulty of pursuing a First Amendment
challenge to IOLTA.
If you’re talking about [IOLTA] money [being] used simply to help indigent persons in
civil litigation, like divorces and landlord-tenant problems, I think that would be tough to
raise a First Amendment challenge to . . . . If you’re talking about money used for impact
litigation—to make policy decisions—you might be on more fertile ground. I really
haven’t spent any time looking specifically at how [the various legal aid entities] use their
IOLTA money. It would be a formidable task.
Coyle, supra note 123, at A5.
134. Smith, supra note 130, at 1001.
135. Brown estimated that the interest he would have earned on the funds he was forced to
deposit into an IOLTA account amounted to $4.96. Brown, 538 U.S. at 229.
136. See Smith, supra note 130, at 1001 (suggesting, “if IOLTA challengers pursued a new
attack on First Amendment grounds, proponents of the program would be compelled to initiate a
vigorous defense to save the program—much like the defense to the Fifth Amendment
challenge.”). But see Coyle, supra note 123, at A5 (reporting that, according to Legal Foundation
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C. IOLTA as a Tax
A third potential argument for IOLTA opponents is that at its core, the
IOLTA program is actually a tax. This section considers whether the IOLTA
program is merely a disguised tax and why, if it is a tax, it may be improper.
1.

Is IOLTA a Veiled Tax?

A tax is “an enforced contribution, exacted pursuant to legislative
authority . . . for the purpose of raising revenue to be used for public or
governmental purposes . . . .”137 IOLTA easily fits the first two elements of the
definition. It is certainly enforced in at least the twenty-seven jurisdictions
where participation is mandatory,138 and the transfer of interest to legal aid
funds surely qualifies as a contribution.139 IOLTA also seems to satisfy the
fourth and fifth elements; the purpose of the program is to raise revenue, and
the revenue is to be used for a public or governmental purpose, especially in
light of Justice Stevens’s finding in Brown that “providing legal services to
literally millions of needy Americans certainly qualifies the Foundation’s
distribution of these funds as a ‘public use’ . . . .”140 It would appear, then, that
the only element of the definition that IOLTA does not satisfy is the third:
IOLTA is not “exacted pursuant to legislative authority.”141
IOLTA can still operate as a tax, even though it fails to satisfy all the
definitional elements, because it is the substance, not the form, of a revenueraising measure that makes it a tax. “[T]he question whether a particular
contribution or charge is to be regarded as a tax depends upon its real nature.
If it is in the nature of a tax, it is not material that it may be called by a
different name . . . .”142 IOLTA effectively functions as a tax, despite its
judicial, rather than legislative, origination.

of Washington counsel, David Burman, “[a] First Amendment challenge doesn’t present much
risk”).
137. RICHARD A. WESTIN, WG&L TAX DICTIONARY 779 (2002).
138. For a listing of jurisdictions with mandatory IOLTA programs, see supra note 26, and
accompanying text.
139. WESTIN, supra note 137, at 138 (defining a contribution as “a transfer to another person
with no reciprocal transfer.
Typical examples are contributions to . . . charitable
organizations.”).
140. Brown, 538 U.S. at 232.
141. See supra note 137 and accompanying text for the definition of “tax” being used in this
section. In a wide majority of jurisdictions, IOLTA was created by order of the jurisdiction’s
highest court. IOLTA was enacted under state legislative authority in only five states. See supra
notes 24–25 and accompanying text. More discussion on IOLTA’s judicial enactment is included
later in this section.
142. Rev. Rul. 57-345, 1957-2 C.B. 132–33.
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Problems with IOLTA as a Tax.

IOLTA’s origination in the judicial, rather than legislative, branch of state
governments presents a very rudimentary constitutional issue—separation of
powers.143 During oral argument in Brown, counsel for the justices of the
Washington Supreme Court144 offered a second rationale for IOLTA programs,
“namely that it amounted to a tax beyond the reach of Takings challenges.
‘Why not treat this as a valid revenue measure?’ Dellinger [counsel for the
Washington Supreme Court Justices] asked. To that Justice Antonin Scalia
retorted, ‘Courts have the power to tax?’”145
Indeed, courts do not have the power to tax,146 and a whole new can of
constitutional worms may be opened in the forty-six jurisdictions147 where the
IOLTA program has been created by order of the jurisdiction’s highest court.
However, despite the likely success of such a challenge, this defect in
construction has an easy remedy that would allow IOLTA programs to
continue: State legislatures need only pass a statute authorizing IOLTA.
One might assume that the general public supports providing legal services
for the indigent, especially when led to believe it costs them nothing.
However, statutory authorization of IOLTA may be an unappealing solution
for state legislatures because of the anti-tax bias of the average American
citizen. After all, new taxes or increases in tax are the sorts of things that cost
re-elections.148
Counsel for Washington Legal Foundation alluded to IOLTA as a tax not
long after Brown was decided.149 “The IOLTA people’s theory is that no-one
gets hurt by [IOLTA]. But this is a tax on a small number of people.”150 In
essence, IOLTA is a tax imposed on a select group of people, users of legal
services.
Moreover, IOLTA has a very narrow scope of application. The IOLTA
“tax” is not imposed on all users of legal services, as a filing fee would be, it is
143. See infra note 145.
144. The Washington Supreme Court created Washington’s IOLTA program, and the Legal
Foundation of Washington, which receives funding from IOLTA. See supra note 24.
145. Mauro, supra note 115, at 13.
146. Courts do not have the power to tax, and any attempt to do so may be met by a
constitutional challenge founded on Separation of Powers principles, as taxation is an enumerated
power of the Legislative Branch under Article 1, section 8, clause 1: “The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
147. For a listing of jurisdictions where IOLTA programs exist by virtue of court order, see
supra note 24.
148. For a discussion of political considerations surrounding IOLTA and the probability of
legislative action, see infra note 153 and accompanying text.
149. Richard Tromans, Supreme Court Upholds Law Firm Legal Aid Subsidy, LEGAL WEEK,
Apr. 17, 2003.
150. Id. (quoting Richard Samp, Chief Counsel for Washington Legal Foundation, in an
interview with LEGAL WEEK).
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imposed on just those users who must, for one reason or another, have a
nominal amount of funds held by their attorney for a short period of time. If
IOLTA were to be construed as tax, it would likely face challenges alleging
that the tax is impermissibly narrow or lacks uniformity in its application.
IV. IOLTA’S FUTURE
Picture a circus performer, teetering precariously on a thin wire cable, high
above the arena floor, juggling several flaming torches at once. The performer
must maintain perfect timing and perfect balance in order to sustain his lofty
perch. IOLTA is like the tightrope walker, juggling several constitutional
issues, taxation considerations, and a very narrowly defined program in order
to continue to fund legal aid programs. How long can IOLTA maintain this
delicate balancing act? Admittedly, social and political conditions surrounding
IOLTA programs make it unlikely that IOLTA opponents will taste victory
anytime soon.
A.

Court Invalidating IOLTA

Having the Court invalidate IOLTA would be a dream come true for
IOLTA opponents, but it is not likely to happen. “[T]he Court’s conclusion [in
Brown] that just compensation was zero as a matter of law rests on such shaky
foundations that one cannot help wondering whether it was driven simply by a
desire not to invalidate IOLTA programs.”151
This desire not to invalidate IOLTA programs will presumably extend to
any constitutional challenges opponents might bring, including First
Amendment challenges. Further, the Court has already passed on one
opportunity to review the free speech and forced association issues
surrounding IOLTA.152
IOLTA opponents may find marginal success in challenging IOLTA on
Separation of Powers grounds as a tax enacted by the judiciary rather than the
legislature, but such success is sure to be short-lived because state legislatures
could easily enact statutes to remedy this defect in the program’s construction.
B.

Legislative Change to IOLTA Programs

The factors that would be necessary to prompt legislative change
invalidating IOLTA programs are not properly aligned. Specifically, IOLTA
taking issues do not generate the kind of political potency that would incite
legislatures to consider statutory remedies. Further, the public sentiment
attached to legal aid programs and the public’s perception of the inability to

151. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, supra note 113, at
376.
152. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text.
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provide other funding for legal aid programs combine to make legislatures and
other elected officials unlikely to disturb the status quo by enacting statutes
that radically alter the IOLTA programs as we know them despite the
feasibility of new approaches to tracking collectively managed accounts made
possible by technology.
Legislatures inclined to take action on the IOLTA debate might consider
altering the general structure of IOLTA accounts by allowing depositors to
decide which charitable institution might receive the interest generated by their
principal—a method akin to the “check-box” method currently found on
personal income tax return forms. The benefit of such a proposal may be that
the choice feature would better position the IOLTA programs of many states to
withstand potential Free Speech and Forced Association challenges. A
significant shortcoming of this proposal is that it does nothing to address the
tension between Brown and Phillips because unless the new variation on
IOLTA allows the owner to withdraw the interest, it will not answer the
questions of takings and the measure of just compensation, and any attempt to
add client consent or control over the interest as a component of IOLTA
programs will resurrect the tax concerns from the program’s early days.153
C. Advances in Technology Resulting in a Phasing Out of IOLTA
By the very construct of the IOLTA program, it may eventually become a
casualty of rapid technological change. Technological changes in software for
tracking sub-accounts have been rapid, and these advances reduce the costs of
administering and tracking so that fewer and fewer accounts fall into the
category of not being able to generate net interest and therefore subject to
IOLTA rules requiring their deposit into pooled accounts.154 But, transaction
costs will never be reduced to zero. Therefore, some deposits will always have
to go into IOLTA accounts, albeit the number will be increasingly small until it
hits that “floor.” Given that IOLTA opponents fought all the way to the
Supreme Court over $4.96 in Brown, it would not appear that the “dog in the
manger” will give up even then.
D. Client Consent Clauses
From the early days of the IOLTA program, it has been suggested that
adding a “client consent” clause to attorney retainer agreements or another
form of client consent to participation in the IOLTA program would provide a

153. See infra notes 155–63 and accompanying text.
154. See In re Ind. State Bar Ass’ns Petition to Authorize a Program Governing Interest On
Lawyers’ Trust Accounts, 550 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Ind. 1990) (The Indiana Supreme Court
suggested that technology as of 1990 was sufficient to make the tracking of individual subaccounts “simple and inexpensive.”).
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route for escaping the Fifth and First Amendment challenges to IOLTA.155
“Yet, the concept of a consensual IOLTA program is no panacea to the ailing
IOLTA. Revising the IOLTA concept to create a system reliant on client
consent would resurrect the tax-related concerns IOLTA programs faced prior
to their initial implementation.”156
Revenue Ruling 81-209 made clear that IOLTA interest would not be
imputed to the owner of the principal under the assignment of income doctrine,
granting this exception for IOLTA programs specifically because depositors
had absolutely no control over the disposition of the interest.157 During oral
argument of Brown, Justice Ginsburg suggested that allowing the owner of the
principal control over the disposition of the interest would transform the
interest into taxable income.158
Presumably, a consent component to IOLTA programs would necessitate
another exception from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), an exception
that seems unlikely to be granted given the rationale that persuaded the IRS to
grant the original exception.159 An alternative to an IRS exception for IOLTA
income would be a congressional amendment to the Internal Revenue Code,
providing a statutory deduction for depositors who consent to participation in
IOLTA.160 Congress has already provided income tax deductions for
charitable contributions,161 and IOLTA could be viewed in that same light, as a
deduction that “encourages private funding of organizations providing
‘essential services’ but which the government alone cannot afford to
finance.”162

155. Lacey, supra note 62, at 931. If IOLTA programs were to operate on a consensual basis,
there could be no taking of the interest, the interest would be given, and thus no need to determine
just compensation; there could be no forced association claim because the association would be
voluntary.
156. Id.
157. Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16–17. The Internal Revenue Service does not classify
IOLTA-generated interest as income for federal income tax purposes “so long as the client has no
control over the decision whether to place the funds in the IOLTA account and does not designate
who will receive the interest generated by the account.” Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S.
156, 162 (1998).
158. Mauro, supra note 115, at 13.
159. Lacey, supra note 62, at 932–33.
The IRS’s primary concern in granting the original income exclusion for IOLTA interest
was the potential for unforeseeable tax-avoidance schemes that could develop incidental
to the exclusion. IOLTA promoters were able to allay the IRS’s concerns by structuring
the program such that there was absolutely no control by clients over the use of their
funds.
Id. (footnote omitted).
160. Id. at 933.
161. I.R.C. § 170(a) (2000) (authorizing income tax deductions for charitable contributions).
162. Lacey, supra note 62, at 934.
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Although some legislative maneuvering might solve the tax problem of a
client consent component to IOLTA, the program will still face other tax
issues, including its judicial creation.163
E.

Alternatives to IOLTA

If IOLTA as we know it were declared unconstitutional by the Court, how
might legal aid be funded? It is possible that the state courts could supplement
lost IOLTA funding with increases in filing fees or bar association dues.
Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court recently raised the state’s annual
licensing fee by $42.00 in order to help offset a shortage in IOLTA income
caused by declining interest rates.164 Missouri took another approach, enacting
a statute that created a “basic civil legal services fund.”165 Revenue generated
by increased filing fees for all actions other than non-alcohol related traffic
violations is channeled into the basic civil legal services fund.166
Providing legal aid for indigent civil litigants will always be a problem,
and thus, courts will always be searching for new and creative funding
alternatives. If IOLTA were to be abolished, it is likely that courts would use
increased fees to cover the cost of legal aid programs.
V. ACCEPTING IOLTA’S THEORETICAL DEFICIENCIES IN EXCHANGE FOR A
JUSTICE SYSTEM ACCESSIBLE TO ALL
Times have certainly changed since IOLTA was created in the early 1980s.
Several of the original justifications for the program, specifically the expense
and difficulty of tracking and paying out meager amounts of interest on
numerous accounts, are less compelling today as a result of technological
advances. IOLTA becomes more objectionable as technological changes
undermine its inceptive rationale, yet the alternatives discussed above may be
inadequate.
Nevertheless, IOLTA’s result is desirable. Providing legal services to the
poor, making the justice system of this country available to all of its citizens, is
an important cornerstone of democracy in action. And so it may be that we
must accept the theoretical deficiencies of IOLTA’s design in exchange for a
163. For a discussion of IOLTA’s infirmities when viewed as a tax, see supra notes 137–50
and accompanying text.
164. Crimmins, supra note 120, at 1. “Net interest on IOLTA accounts, due to declining
interest rates, had fallen from $3.9 million in fiscal 2001 to about $2.3 million in fiscal 2003.” Id.
165. MO. REV. STAT. § 488.031 (2003).
166. Filing fees above and beyond other fees authorized in separate statutes are paid to a
specially created basic civil legal services fund. The new filing fees are $20 for Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals filings, $10 for Circuit Court filings, and $8 for Associate Circuit Court
filings. Id. For a thorough analysis of whether these additional filing fees will withstand
constitutional scrutiny, see Jeanne M. Janchar, Comment, Give Me Your Poor . . . In Support of
the Constitutionality of the Proposed Legal Services Fund, 71 UMKC L. REV. 863 (2003).
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solution to the important problem of ensuring that all citizens have access to
the justice system designed to protect them.
Perhaps it is time for the dog in the manger to realize that the hay just isn’t
worth fighting for. To be sure, IOLTA will remain a matter of principle,
principal, and interest, in more ways than one.
TARRA L. MORRIS*

* J.D. candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law, 2005.
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